Cambridge International AS & A Level

Cambridge International Examinations
Cambridge International Advanced Subsidiary and Advanced Level

HISTORY **9389/31**

Paper 3 Interpretations Question **October/November 2016**

1 hour

No Additional Materials are required.

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READ THESE INSTRUCTIONS FIRST

An answer booklet is provided inside this question paper. You should follow the instructions on the front cover of the answer booklet. If you need additional answer paper ask the invigilator for a continuation booklet.

This paper contains **three** sections:
Section A: Topic 1 The Causes and Impact of British Imperialism, c. 1850–1939
Section B: Topic 2 The Holocaust
Section C: Topic 3 The Origins and Development of the Cold War, 1941–1950

Answer the question on the topic you have studied.

The marks are given in brackets [ ] at the end of each question.
At the end of the examination, fasten all your work securely together.

This document consists of **4** printed pages and **1** Insert.

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Section A: Topic 1

The Causes and Impact of British Imperialism, c.1850–1939

1 Read the extract and then answer the question.

A problem arises when we try to decide the relative balance between profit and power in explaining British motives for expansion. The answer, I suggest, is to be found in distinguishing between two *levels* of motive. At the metropolitan governmental level, the 'official mind' in Whitehall (recruited from aristocratic, academic and professional classes) was preoccupied by political decisions – with the higher questions of international relations, the mission of spreading 'civilisation', and the duty of protecting the national interest by maintaining prestige and strategic security. Disdainful of merely commercial activities, and temperamentally detached from special interest groups of whatever kind, the 'official mind' would nevertheless assist these in so far as they affected the national interest as Whitehall defined it. Then, at the local overseas level, the interests of private individuals were decidedly selfish: investors, traders and businessmen seeking profit, adventurers seeking fame and aggrandisement, missionaries seeking souls. Private individuals expected to carry out their activities without government interference. Government ministers saw little reason to promote these local-level interests. The profit motive was fundamental at the local level but was unlikely to impress Whitehall as a guide for policy at the decision-making level.

Territory could, however, be acquired when the two levels of interest interlocked. Individuals overseas could create circumstances which made an acquisition possible or even probable, usually through their economic endeavour, but they could never ensure or determine it. The actual decision to run up the flag was usually taken by Whitehall. Occasionally it was taken by its overseas representatives, the governors and military officers. These were not, of course, supposed to take such decisions, but the limits were imprecise and for much of the century there was a small but vital gap between what a really ambitious officer on the spot could do and what his metropolitan masters dared to veto. Thus, no explanation of the taking of territory will ever be satisfactory unless it is considered at two levels: the one making final political decisions within a European context, and the other contributing to the creation of preparatory conditions in a non-European context, requiring, but certainly not always attaining, government control. Where local indigenous regimes were unable to maintain an adequate system of law and order sufficient for the successful operation of European economic activities, the government might step in. But it did so chiefly because it believed these chaotic conditions could lead to international conflicts or humanitarian abuses, which it was its job to contain. The government was *never* manipulated by economic pressure groups, which, in any case, could never agree amongst themselves.

We should amend previous models of an interacting centre and periphery, and envisage two different *levels* of activity (rather than two different spheres), two sets of interests interacting along the axis of a chain of command. Thus we have a model of metropolitan policies (at one level) being handed down from the elite group at the centre, and (at another level) local pressures (set in motion by concession-seekers and colonial adventurers) being transmitted upwards from the geographical periphery. Neither the metropolitan nor the local level of action was in itself decisive. What clinched matters was an effective interaction mediated by or funnelled through an individual. In this model a key role thus exists for the 'man on the spot' – the proconsuls, the ambassadors, the high commissioners, the governors, the viceroys, the commanders-in-chief – who could determine the extent to which imperial policies worked out at the centre, or local pressures generated overseas, would be implemented or supported.

What can you learn from this extract about the interpretation and approach of the historian who wrote it? Use the extract and your knowledge of the British Empire to explain your answer. [40]

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Section B: Topic 2

The Holocaust

2 Read the extract and then answer the question.

The most important concentration measure in Poland prior to the formation of the ghettoes was the establishment of Jewish councils (*Judenräte*). According to the General Government decree of 28 November 1939, every Jewish community with a population of up to 10 000 had to elect a Judenrat of twelve members, and every community with more than 10 000 had to choose twenty-four. The decree was published after many of the councils had already been established, but it signified an assertion of civil jurisdiction over the councils and a confirmation of their character as public institutions. In Poland, as in the Reich, the councils were filled with pre-war Jewish leaders. However, the circumstances surrounding the newly-installed Judenräte were radically different from the old days. Whilst some of the members might have been eager for public recognition before the occupation, now they felt anxieties as they thought about the unknowns. When Adam Czerniaków met with several other new appointees in his office, he showed them where he was keeping a key to a drawer of his desk, in which he had placed a bottle containing twenty-four cyanide pills.

Before the war these Jewish leaders had been concerned with synagogues, religious schools, cemeteries, orphanages and hospitals. From now on, their activities would include another, quite different function: the transmission of German directives and orders to the Jewish population, the use of Jewish police to enforce German will, the deliverance of Jewish property, Jewish labour, and Jewish lives to the German enemy. The councils continued until the end to make desperate attempts to alleviate the suffering and to stop the mass dying in the ghettoes. But at the same time the councils responded to German demands with automatic compliance and invoked German authority to compel the community's obedience. The members of a Judenrat were held personally responsible for the execution of all German instructions. In fact the Jewish leaders were so fearful in the presence of their German overlords that the Nazi officers merely had to signal their desires. As one Nazi pointed out in a moment of satisfaction and complacency, 'The Jews step forward and they receive their orders.' Thus the Jewish leadership both saved and destroyed its people, saving some and destroying others, saving at one moment and destroying at the next. Some leaders refused to keep this power, others became intoxicated with it.

As time passed, the councils became increasingly impotent in their efforts to cope with the welfare portion of their task, but they made themselves felt all the more in their implementation of Nazi decrees. With the growth of the destructive function of the Judenräte, many Jewish leaders felt an almost irresistible urge to look like their German masters. In March 1940 a Nazi observer in Krakow was struck by the contrast between the poverty and filth in the Jewish quarter and the business-like luxury of the Jewish community headquarters, which was filled with beautiful charts, comfortable leather chairs, and heavy carpets. In Warsaw the Jewish leaders took to wearing boots. In Lodz the ghetto 'dictator', Rumkowski, printed postage stamps bearing his likeness and made speeches that contained expressions such as 'my children', 'my factories', and 'my Jews'. From the inside, then, it seemed already quite clear that the Jewish leaders had become rulers, reigning and disposing over the ghetto community with a finality that was absolute.

What can you learn from this extract about the interpretation and approach of the historian who wrote it? Use the extract and your knowledge of the Holocaust to explain your answer. [40]

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[Turn over

Section C: Topic 3

The Origins and Development of the Cold War, 1941–1950

3 Read the extract and then answer the question.

To the extent that the Cold War was about Germany, the final outcome – a divided country – was probably preferred by everyone to the alternative of allowing it to fall united into the hands of their opponents. No one planned this outcome in May 1945, but few were deeply discontented with it. By 1948 the United States, like Great Britain, was not unhappy to see the emergence of a divided Germany, with American influence dominant in the larger, western segment. But although there were some, like George Kennan, who had perceptively anticipated this outcome, they were in the minority. The Americans, like Stalin, were improvising in these years. It is sometimes suggested that certain key American decisions and declarations, notably the Truman Doctrine of March 1947, precipitated Stalin's retreat from compromise to rigidity, and that in this sense the responsibility for European divisions lay with Washington's insensitivity or worse, its calculated intransigence. But this is not so.

For the Truman Doctrine, to take this example, had remarkably little impact on Soviet calculations. Truman sought Congressional approval for a $400 million increase in his budget for overseas aid: to secure the funding he presented the request in the context of a crisis of communist insurgency. Congress took him seriously, but Moscow did not. Stalin was not much interested in Turkey and Greece – the chief beneficiaries of the aid package – and he understood perfectly well that his own sphere of interest was unlikely to be affected by Truman's grandstanding. On the contrary, he continued to suppose that there were very good prospects for a split within the Western camp, of which the American takeover of former British responsibilities in the eastern Mediterranean was a sign. Whatever led Stalin to adjust his calculations in Eastern Europe, it was decidedly not the rhetoric of American domestic politics.

The immediate cause of the division of Germany and Europe lies rather in Stalin's own errors in these years. In central Europe, where he would initially have preferred a united Germany, weak and neutral, he squandered his advantage in 1945 and subsequent years by uncompromising rigidity and confrontational tactics. If Stalin's hope had been to let Germany rot until the fruit of German resentment and hopelessness fell into his lap, then he miscalculated seriously – though there were moments when the Allied authorities in western Germany wondered whether he might yet succeed. In that sense the Cold War in Europe was an unavoidable outcome of the Soviet dictator's personality and the system over which he ruled. The fact remains that Germany was at his feet, as his opponents well knew – 'The trouble is that we are playing with fire which we have nothing to put out', as Marshall stated to the National Security Council in February 1948. All the Soviet Union needed to do was accept the Marshall Plan and convince the majority of Germans of Moscow's good faith in seeking a neutral, independent Germany. In 1947 this would radically have shifted the European balance of advantage. Whatever Marshall or his advisers might have thought of such manoeuvres, they would have been helpless to prevent them. That such tactical calculations were beyond Stalin cannot be credited to the West. As Dean Acheson put it on another occasion, 'We were fortunate in our opponents.'

What can you learn from this extract about the interpretation and approach of the historian who wrote it? Use the extract and your knowledge of the Cold War to explain your answer. [40]

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